Introduction
The Sino-Philippine Arbitration for the South China Sea ("SCS") Disputes finally ended on July 12, 2016, with a Merits Award totally in Philippine favor. As the respondent, China rejected this arbitration as well as the Awards on Jurisdiction, Admissibility and Merits. Meanwhile, the Government in Taiwan (hereinafter Taiwan) started to publish legal arguments and factual information from July 7, 2015 to refute the Philippines' relevant arguments for this arbitration. It is interesting to review the role of Taiwan in this arbitration. In this research, the author will outline the development of this arbitration where the interactions between Taiwan, the Philippines, and the Tribunal will be focused stage by stage. This paper is composed of four parts including a short Introduction and Conclusion. Part two will examine the beginning and evolution of the SCS Arbitration. Part three will address Taiwan's role through this Arbitration.
enclosed by the U-Shaped Line ("USL").
Five groups of claims were presented by the Notification. 5 First, China's rights concerning the SCS maritime areas are those established by the UNCLOS only and consist of territorial sea, contiguous zone, Exclusive Economic Zone ("EEZ") and continental shelf; China's maritime claims therein based on USL contravene the UNCLOS and are invalid. Second, Mischief, McKennan, Gaven and Subi Reefs are low-tide elevations ("LTEs"), instead of 'islands' or 'rocks' under Article 121. None of them are located in China's continental shelf. Mischief and McKennan Reefs are part of the Philippine continental shelf. Thus, China's occupation of these four maritime features and construction activities thereon are unlawful and should be terminated. Third, Johnson, Cuarteron, and Fiery Cross Reefs as well as Scarborough Shoal are rocks under Article 121(3) which may generate territorial sea only. Having unlawfully claimed maritime entitlements beyond 12 nautical miles ("nm") from these features, China should refrain from preventing Philippine vessels from exploiting living resources in waters adjacent to Scarborough Shoal and Johnson Reef, and from undertaking other activities inconsistent with the UNCLOS at or in the vicinity of these features. Fourth, the Philippines is entitled under the UNCLOS to a 12 nm territorial sea, a 200 nm EEZ, and a continental shelf measured from its archipelagic baselines on WPS. China has unlawfully claimed and exploited the natural resources in this EEZ and continental shelf, and prevented the Philippines from exploiting the living and non-living resources therein. Fifth, China has unlawfully interfered with Philippine exercise of its navigational rights and other rights under the UNCLOS within and beyond the Philippine EEZ. China should desist from these unlawful activities. 6 As China rejected the Philippines' arbitration request from the very beginning, 7 its complaints against the Philippines were missing in the Submissions. 20 China declined. The hearing took place on July 7-13, 2015 (July Hearing) in the Peace Palace, to address the jurisdictional and admissibility issues.
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C. The Jurisdictional Award
On October 29, 2015 the PCA released the Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility (Jurisdictional Award), moving all Philippine Submissions into the merits phase.
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Submissions 1-4, 6-7 and 10-14 were held to reflect disputes concerning the interpretation or application of the UNCLOS, while not relating to sovereignty or concerning sea boundary delimitation. Submissions 5 and 8-9 were held to reflect disputes while not relating to sovereignty. For Submissions 1-2, 5, 8-9, 12 and 14, there remain unresolved jurisdictional issues not of exclusively preliminary nature. The Tribunal decided to move these seven Submissions into Merits Phase to settle the remaining jurisdictional issues.
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D. Second Hearing and the Amended Submissions
The second hearing was held on November 24-30, 2015 (November Hearing) to discuss the remaining issues of jurisdiction and admissibility as well as the merits issues. 24 
Taiwan's Role in the SCS Arbitration
A. The Initial Stage
The 'effective control' principle underpinned the Philippine formulation of Submissions in determining China's maritime entitlements in WPS. In the Notification, the Philippines identified all eight maritime features occupied by Beijing Government, while requesting the Tribunal to decide their legal status. The Philippines contended that four of them were only 'LTEs' incapable of generating territorial sea, while the remaining four were 'rocks' capable of generating territorial sea only. Without EEZ and continental shelf in WPS, China's law enforcement activities there should be deemed 'trespassing' into the Philippine EEZ and continental shelf.
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Whether 'Taiwan factor' should be ignored by the Notification in this context seemed a hard choice, as Taiwan occupies the biggest island in the Spratly Islands, i.e., Itu Aba (Taiping Island 
C. Taiwan's Official Statements on July 7, 2015
On the first day of the July Hearing, Taiwan China only claimed islands south of the Paracels for the first time in 1935, when it prepared a map depicting various insular features in the Spratlys. You can see a copy on the screen. President Ma refers to this map as "proclaiming sovereignty" over these features "for the first time". Fifth, no feature in the Spratly Islands generated EEZ or continental shelf. No human settlement existed on any feature until mid-20th century, proving their non-habitability. Itu Aba and other features in the Spratly Islands were always militarily occupied to establish and reinforce sovereignty claims. Military bases were insufficient to prove an insular feature to be capable of sustaining human habitation or economic life of its own. 56 Taiwan's Statement on the SCS on July 7, 2015 and subsequent Statement on October 31, 2015 lacked evidence to prove that Itu Aba could sustain human habitation, 57 as no fresh water, no natural nourishment, and no soil existed there. 58 The report prepared by Prescott and Schofield for the Philippines assessed Itu Aba as having "no permanent indigenous population, the personnel stationed there are reliant on supplies provided from outside and there is no evidence of meaningful economic activity ongoing or in the past." 59 Sixth, it was not until July 7, 2015 that Taiwan started to claim EEZ and continental shelf out of Itu Aba. The timing was after the critical date of this arbitration. 60 Moreover, this claim violated Taiwan's 1998 Law on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, as no baseline had been decided yet for Itu Aba. 61 On the contrary, Article 121(3) tries to prevent such developments and to forestall a provocative and counterproductive effort to manufacture entitlements.
D. New Contentions of the Philippines in November Hearings
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Concerning "historical economic life of their own of the features of the Spratly Islands," the Tribunal concluded:
all of the economic activity in the Spratly Islands that appears in the historical record has been essentially extractive in nature (i.e., mining for guano, collecting shells, and fishing), aimed to a greater or lesser degree at utilising the resources of the Spratlys for the benefit of the populations of Hainan, Formosa, Japan, the Philippines, Viet Nam, or elsewhere. …, To constitute the economic life of the feature, economic activity must be oriented around the feature itself and not be focused solely on the surrounding territorial sea or entirely dependent on external resources. … Extractive economic activity, without the presence of a stable local community, necessarily falls short of constituting the economic life of the feature.
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Applying this standard, the history of extractive economic activity does not constitute, for the features of the Spratly Islands, evidence of an economic life of their own.
… The effect of Article 121(3) is to prevent such features -whose economic benefit, if any, to the State which controls them is for resources alone -from generating a further entitlement to a 200-M EEZ and continental shelf that would infringe on the entitlements generated by inhabited territory or on the area reserved for the common heritage of mankind. 
Conclusion
Finally, Taiping Island occupied by Taiwan was held by the Tribunal to be incapable of generating EEZ and continental shelf, as such other smaller features in the Spratly Islands. Therefore, China was held without EEZ and continental shelf entitlements in WPS. Those LTEs occupied by the PRC were held to be located outside China's EEZ and continental shelf. China's trespass into the Philippine EEZ and continental shelf was held to be true. Since July Hearing in 2015, Taiwan Government has actively engaged in the legal and factual debates with the Philippines, as if it were the Respondent of this case for certain matters. Critically, the Tribunal declined the invitation offered by President Ma to visit Taiping Island. Had the Arbitrators visited Taiping Island and stayed there for a while, would this Tribunal have decided differently? A doubt lingers.
Another important question arises. Why did President Ma and CSIL's amicus curiae not touch upon legal issues of interpretation of Article 121? With the Tribunal's attention paid to Taiwan's statements prepared by heavyweight experts of international law, a huge difference could have been made had they challenged Philippine position on this fundamental issue of treaty interpretation. After all, the Merits Award did reject certain Philippine arguments regarding factual situations of Taiping Island!
